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Abstract
The leximin solution— which selects an allocation
that maximizes the minimum utility, then the sec-
ond minimum utility, and so forth — is known to
provide EFX (envy-free up to any good) fairness
guarantee in some contexts when allocating indi-
visible goods. However, it remains unknown how
fair the leximin solution is when used to allocate in-
divisible chores. In this paper, we demonstrate that
the leximin solution can be modified to also provide
compelling fairness guarantees for the allocation of
indivisible chores. First, we generalize the defini-
tion of the leximin solution. Then, we show that
the leximin solution finds a PROP1 (proportional
up to one good) and PO (Pareto-optimal) allocation
for 3 or 4 agents in the context of chores allocation
with additive distinct valuations. Additionally, we
prove that the leximin solution is EFX for combi-
nations of goods and chores for agents with general
but identical valuations.
1 Introduction
Fair allocation of indivisible resources plays an important role
in the society. In a variety of scenarios, such as task distribu-
tion at work, estate partitioning in life, and asset restructur-
ing in business, people seek an allocation that satisfies each
party’s interest in a fair and efficient manner. To reach this
ultimate goal, researchers have come up with various fairness
notions [Foley, 1967; Lipton et al., 2004; Caragiannis et al.,
2016; Conitzer et al., 2017]. However, as Aziz [2016] noted,
most of these fairness notions focus solely on allocation of
goods (items with positive utilities), while items that need
to be allocated can also be chores (i.e. they have negative
utilities). Furthermore, the results in goods allocation may
not necessarily carry over to chores. As Aziz et al. [2018]
and Aleksandrov [2018] demonstrated in their work, several
natural extension of the Maximum Nash Welfare solution,
which is both fair and efficient when used to allocate indi-
visible goods [Caragiannis et al., 2016], fails to provide any
reasonable fairness guarantee when chores are involved. The
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previous observations lead to this key question: does a fair
allocation always exist when chores are involved?
In this paper, we partially answer this question by showing
that the leximin solution — which selects an allocation that
maximizes the minimum utility, then the second minimum
utility, and so forth [Sen, 1976, 1977; Rawls, 2009] — pro-
vides compelling fairness guarantee in several settings that
involve chores.
1.1 Related work
Fair allocation problem has been studied extensively in sev-
eral different fields and contexts [Brams and Taylor, 1996;
Aziz, 2016]. Among these studies, various different fairness
notions have been established [Foley, 1967; Lipton et al.,
2004; Budish, 2010; Caragiannis et al., 2016; Conitzer et al.,
2017]. One popular fairness notion is envy-freeness (EF)
[Foley, 1967], which states that no agent should prefer an-
other agent’s set of items to her own. Another appealing fair-
ness notion is proportionality [Steinhaus, 1948], which states
that each agent should obtain at least 1/n of her total value
for all the items. However, envy-freeness and proportional-
ity cannot always be guaranteed, especially when we allo-
cate indivisible items. Therefore, a series of relaxations to
these notions have been proposed, including envy-freeness up
to one good (EF1), envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) and
proportionality up to one good (PROP1) [Lipton et al., 2004;
Caragiannis et al., 2016; Conitzer et al., 2017].
Another important concern in allocation problems is ef-
ficiency. In this regard, an allocation is said to be Pareto-
optimal (PO) if there does not exist another allocation that in-
creases the value received by at least one agent without com-
promising anyone else.
Researchers have also proposed various algorithms which
prove the existence of or even efficiently find an allocation
that achieves these fairness notions in different contexts. For
fair allocation of indivisible goods, Lipton et al. [2004] pro-
vided an algorithm that finds an EF1 allocation for gen-
eral valuations but does not guarantee PO. Caragiannis et al.
[2016] showed that the maximum Nash welfare (MNW)
solution guarantees EF1 and PO for additive valuations.
Plaut and Roughgarden [2017] showed that the leximin so-
lution guarantees EFX and PO for general but identical val-
uations with nonzero marginal utility. Meanwhile, the lex-
imin++ solution, a modification of the leximin solution they
proposed, guarantees EFX but not PO for all general but iden-
tical valuations.
However, fair allocation of indivisible chores only started
to receive attention after Aziz [2016] noted that the results in
goods allocation may not necessarily carry over to chores.
For combinations of goods and chores, Aziz et al. [2018]
showed that the double round robin algorithm can always
generate an EF1 allocation when valuations are additive. For
the two agent case, they presented a polynomial-time algo-
rithm that finds an EF1 and PO allocation. Aleksandrov
[2018] also showed that a modified version of the leximin++
solution, which he calls leximax-, finds EFX allocations for
indivisible chores with anti-monotone identical valuations.
For fair allocation of divisible goods and chores,
Bogomolnaia et al. [2017, 2019] showed that competitive so-
lutions always exist and guarantee EF and PO.When all items
are chores, they showed that the efficient allocation with the
largest product of disutility is one of possibly many competi-
tive solutions.
1.2 Our contribution
In this paper, we consider the problem of fair and efficient
allocation of indivisible chores as well as combinations of in-
divisible goods and chores for more than two agents. Specifi-
cally, we focus on the fairness guarantee provided by the gen-
eralization of the leximin solution.
• In Section 2, we present our model for allocation of indi-
visible items and extend approximate fairness definitions
for goods to include chores. And most importantly, we
define our generalization of the leximin solution.
• In Section 3, through the leximin solution, we show that
a PROP1 and PO allocation of chores always exists for
3 or 4 agents with additive valuations.
• In Section 4, through the leximin solution, we show that
an EFX allocation for combinations of goods and chores
always exists for agents with general but identical valu-
ations. With nonzero marginal utility constraint, PO can
also be achieved in this context.
2 Model
LetN denote the set of agents andM denote the set of items,
where |N | = n and |M| = m. Throughout this paper, we as-
sume that items are indivisible, so that each item can only be
allocated to one agent and in full. Each agent i has a val-
uation function vi : 2
M → R that indicates her utility for
each subset ofM. We slightly abuse notation here and define
vi(o) = vi({o}) for o ∈M.
For general valuation function v, we assume that vi(∅) = 0
and that vi’s are item-wise monotone. If valuation function v
is additive, we further assume v(S) =
∑
o∈S v(o). By item-
wise monotone, we mean that each agent i can partitionM
into (Gi, Ci) such that she considers all items in Gi as goods
and all items in Ci as chores, i.e. vi(S) ≤ vi(S ∪ {g}) if
g ∈ Gi and vi(S) ≥ vi(S ∪ {c}) if c ∈ Ci. Throughout the
paper, we slightly abuse the notation of g and c. Whenever
we use g, we implicitly mean that the item is a good; simi-
larly, whenever we use c, we implicitly mean that the item is
a chore.
Finally, an allocation A is a partition ofM into n disjoint
subsets, (A1, A2, . . . , An), where Ai is the set of items, or
bundle, given to agent i. Throughout the paper, we are only
interested in complete allocations, where all items are allo-
cated.
2.1 Fairness notions
In this paper, we make use of two relaxations of envy-freeness
and proportionality, namely envy-freeness up to any item
(EFX) and proportionality up to one item (PROP1). We
present their formal definitions here.
Definition 1 (EFX). An allocation A is envy-free up to any
item (EFX) if for all i, j ∈ N such that i envies j, vi(Ai) ≥
vi(Aj\{g}) for all g ∈ Aj ∩Gi and vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj ∪ {c})
for all c ∈ Ai ∩ Ci.
In other words, EFX demands that, if agent i envies agent
j, removing any item in agent j’s bundle that is considered as
a good by agent i guarantees that agent i does not envy agent
j. Similarly, giving agent j a copy of any item in agent i’s
bundle that agent i considers as a chore guarantees that agent
i does not envy agent j.
In the same fashion, we give our definition of PROP1 for
both goods and chores.
Definition 2 (PROP1). An allocation A is proportional up to
one item (PROP1) if for all i ∈ N ,
• vi(Ai) ≥ vi(M)/n, or
• ∃g ∈M\Ai s.t. vi(Ai ∪ {g}) ≥ vi(M)/n, or
• ∃c ∈ Ai s.t. vi(Ai\{c}) ≥ vi(M)/n.
In addition to fairness, people are also concerned with effi-
ciency in allocation problems. A classical efficiency notion is
Pareto-optimality.
Definition 3. Given an allocation A, another allocation B is
a Pareto-improvement of A if vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai) for all i ∈ N
and vj(Bj) > vj(Aj) for some j ∈ N .
Definition 4 (PO). An allocation A is Pareto-optimal (PO)
if there is no feasible allocation that is a Pareto-improvement
of A.
2.2 The leximin solution
The traditional leximin solution selects the allocation that
maximizes the minimum utility among all agents. If there
are multiple allocations that achieve this minimum utility, it
chooses among them the one that maximizes the secondmini-
mum utility, and so on. To generalize the leximin solution, for
each agent i, we define an objective function fi : 2
M → Rd
that outputs a d-dimensional objective tuple, instead of a
scalar utility score. The objective tuples are compared lex-
icographically. In other words, we start by comparing their
first entries. If their first entries are the same, then we com-
pare their second entries, and so on. The generalized leximin
solution selects the allocation that maximizes the minimum
objective tuple among all agents.
More formally, Algorithm 1 defines a comparison opera-
tor ≺ that poses a total ordering over all allocations. Then
Algorithm 1 Leximin Comparison Operator (Returns true if
A ≺ B)
XA ← order agents by increasing objective tuple fi(Ai),
then by some arbitrary but consistent tiebreak method for
agents with the same objective tuple
XB ← corresponding ordering of agents under B
for l ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
i← XAl
j ← XBl
if fi(Ai) 6= fj(Bj) then
return fi(Ai) < fj(Bj)
end if
end for
return false
the leximin solution selects the greatest allocation under this
ordering.
Note that the traditional leximin solution is a special case
of this more general leximin solution where fi(S) = vi(S).
The leximin++ solution defined in [Plaut and Roughgarden,
2017], which maximizes the minimum utility of any agent
and then the number of goods owned by the agent with the
minimum utility, is another special case of this generalized
leximin solution where fi(S) = (vi(S), |vi(S)|).
3 PROP1 and PO allocation of chores for
additive valuations
In this section, we show that the leximin solution provides
promising fairness and efficiency guarantees in allocation of
chores for agents with additive utilities. More formally, sup-
pose that vi’s are additive and re-scale v so that vi(M) = U
for all i (note that U is negative). Then we have the following
result.
Theorem 1. Let fi(S) = vi(S). The leximin allocation A
with respect to f is PROP1 and PO when there are 3 or 4
agents in the context of chores allocation with additive utili-
ties.
Proof. PO comes directly from the property of the leximin
solution. If we can find an allocation B which is a Pareto-
improvement of A, then vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai) for all i ∈ N and
vj(Bj) > vj(Aj) for some j ∈ N and so A ≺ B. Thus A
cannot be the leximin allocation.
Suppose A is not PROP1. According to our definition of
PROP1, there must exist an agent i such that
vi(Ai)− vi(c) <
U
n
∀c ∈ Ai. (1)
Since the leximin allocation A is PO, there must exist an
agent j who does not envy anyone. To see this, we can look
at the envy graph generated by allocation A. The envy graph
contains a directed edge e = (u, v) if agent u envies agent
v. Suppose for contradiction that every agent j envies some
other agent. Then starting at an arbitrary agent s, since every
agent envies someone else, we can repeatedly follow an ar-
bitrary outgoing edge from the current agent until we find an
envy cycle. For agents in the envy cycle, we can reassign to
each agent the bundle she envies. This reassignment will in-
crease the utilities of all agents in the cycle without affecting
other agents, which contradicts with PO.
Now consider this agent j who doesn’t envy any other
agent. Since agent j doesn’t envy any other agent, we must
have,
vj(Aj) ≥
U
n
. (2)
Let A−i = {c|c ∈ Ai, vi(c) < 0} and |A
−
i | = a. Clearly by
Equation 1, a ≥ 2. Note also vi(A
−
i ) = vi(Ai).
Consider the chore c1 in A
−
i that agent j dislikes the least,
i.e. c1 = argmaxc∈A−
i
vj(c). Suppose for contradiction that
vj(Aj) + vj(c1) > vi(Ai), we can construct A
′ by giving
(Ai \ {c1}) to agent i and (Aj ∪ {c1}) to agent j. Since
vi(A
′
i) = vi(Ai\{c1}) = vi(Ai)− vi(c1) > vi(Ai)
vj(A
′
j) = vj(Aj ∪ {c1}) = vj(Aj) + vj(c1) > vi(Ai)
vk(A
′
k) = vk(Ak) ∀k 6= {i, j}
we have A ≺ A′. This contradicts with the fact that A is the
leximin allocation with respect to f . So it must be the case
that
vj(Aj) + vj(c1) ≤ vi(Ai). (3)
Consider the chore c2 in agent i’s bundle that agent i dis-
likes the most, i.e. c2 = argminc∈Ai vi(c). According to the
definition of PROP1, for all c in agent i’s bundle, we know
vi(Ai)−vi(c) <
U
n
. In particular, we have vi(Ai)−vi(c2) <
U
n
. Suppose vi(Ai) = (1+ǫ1)
U
n
+vi(c2)where ǫ1 > 0. Since
c2 is the most disliked item in agent i’s bundle, we have,
a · vi(c2) ≤ vi(Ai) = (1 + ǫ1)
U
n
+ vi(c2).
After some simplification, we have,
vi(c2) ≤
1 + ǫ1
a− 1
U
n
.
Therefore,
vi(Ai) = (1 + ǫ1)
U
n
+ vi(c2)
≤ (1 + ǫ1)
U
n
+
1 + ǫ1
a− 1
U
n
=
a(1 + ǫ1)
a− 1
U
n
=
(
1 +
1
a− 1
+
aǫ1
a− 1
)
U
n
. (4)
Suppose vi(Ai) =
(
1 + 1
a−1 +
aǫ2
a−1
)
U
n
where ǫ2 ≥ ǫ1 > 0.
According to Equation 2, we can suppose vj(Aj) = (1 −
ǫ3)
U
n
where 0 ≤ ǫ3 ≤ 1. Then from Equation 3 and Equa-
tion 4, we have,
vj(c1) ≤ vi(Ai)− vj(Aj)
=
(
1 +
1
a− 1
+
aǫ2
a− 1
)
U
n
− (1− ǫ3)
U
n
=
(
1
a− 1
+
aǫ2
a− 1
+ ǫ3
)
U
n
.
Summing agent j’s valuation of agent i’s bundle and her own
bundle, we have,
vj(Ai) + vj(Aj) ≤ avj(c1) + vj(Aj)
≤
[
2 +
1
a− 1
+
a2ǫ2
a− 1
+ (a− 1)ǫ3
]
U
n
Therefore, there must exists an agent k 6= i, j such that,
vj(Ak) ≥
U − vj(Ai)− vj(Aj)
n− 2
≥
U −
[
2 + 1
a−1 +
a2ǫ2
a−1 + (a− 1)ǫ3
]
U
n
n− 2
=
U − 2U
n
n− 2
−
(
1
a−1 +
a2ǫ2
a−1 + (a− 1)ǫ3
n− 2
)
U
n
=
(
1−
1
a−1 +
a2ǫ2
a−1 + (a− 1)ǫ3
n− 2
)
U
n
.
Since agent j doesn’t envy any other agent, her valuation of
any other agent’s bundle cannot be larger than her valuation
of her own bundle. However,
1
a− 1
+
a2ǫ2
a− 1
+ (a− 1)ǫ3 >
1
a− 1
+ (a− 1)ǫ3
≥ ǫ3 ·
(
(a− 1) +
1
a− 1
)
≥ 2ǫ3
Therefore,
vj(Ak) ≥
(
1−
1
a−1 +
a2ǫ2
a−1 + (a− 1)ǫ3
n− 2
)
U
n
>
(
1−
2ǫ3
n− 2
)
U
n
.
So vj(Ak) > vj(Aj) when n = 3 or 4, which contradicts
the assumption that agent j does not envy anyone. So when
n = 3 or 4, there can’t exist an agent i such that
vi(Ai)− vi(c) <
U
n
∀c ∈ Ai.
In conclusion, when there are 3 or 4 agents, the allocation
found by the leximin solution with respect to f is PROP1 and
PO.
3.1 Limitations of the leximin solution
Since we showed that the leximin solution with fi(S) =
vi(S) guarantees PROP1 and PO for 3 or 4 agents with
additive valuations, a natural question to ask is whether it
works for 5 or more agents. Unfortunately, the answer is no.
We show this by providing a counterexample with 5 agents,
where the leximin allocation is not PROP1.
Theorem 2. Let fi(S) = vi(S). The leximin allocation A
with respect to f cannot guarantee PROP1 when there are 5
or more agents.
a b c d e f g
A1 -6 -6 -6 -9 -9 -9 -10
A2 -18.1 -18.1 -18.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
A3 -18.1 -18.1 -18.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
A4 -18.1 -18.1 -18.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
A5 -18.1 -18.1 -18.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Table 1: An example where the leximin solution with respect to f
fails to achieve PROP1 with 5 agents
Proof. Consider the example shown in Table 1. We claim
that the leximin allocation with respect to f is marked by the
circles. To see this, clearly, we can’t allocate any item a, b or
c to any agent other than Agent 1 since
v1({a, b, c}) = −18 > vi({o}) = −18.1
∀i ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}, o ∈ {a, b, c}.
So we must give items a, b and c to Agent 1. For the rest
of items, it’s clear that each agent should get the item they
dislike the least. If this is not the case, one agent will have a
utility that is no higher than −0.2, which is worse than A.
However, for Agent 1,
v1(A1\{o}) = −12 <
U
n
=
−55
5
= −11
∀o ∈ A1 = {a, b, c}.
So the leximin allocation with respect to f is not PROP1 in
this example.
Similar examples can also be constructed for more than
5 agents. This shows that our analysis is in fact tight. The
leximin solution works for 3 or 4 agents in this setting but
not more than that.
4 EFX allocation of goods and chores for
general but identical valuations
Plaut and Roughgarden [2017] showed that in the context of
goods allocation with general but identical valuations, the
leximin++ solution guarantees EFX. The leximin++ solution
is a special case of the generalized leximin solution where
f(S) = (v(S), |S ∩ G|) (we omit the i subscripts here since
the valuations are identical).
In this section, we show that by setting f(S) = (v(S), |S∩
G|,−|S ∩ C|), the leximin solution with respect to f pro-
vides the same fairness guarantee when used to allocate com-
binations of goods and chores for agents that have general-
ized but identical valuations. Essentially, the leximin solution
with respect to f selects the allocation that maximizes the
minimum utility of any agent. After maximizing the mini-
mum utility, it maximizes the number of goods owned by the
agent with the minimum utility. Furthermore, it minimizes
the number of chores owned by the agent with the minimum
utility. If there are multiple allocations that achieve this, this
leximin solution repeats this process on the second minimum
utility, and so on. Our proof follows the same paradigm as
[Plaut and Roughgarden, 2017], but is applied to a more com-
plicated setting.
Theorem 3. Let f(S) = (v(S), |S ∩ G|,−|S ∩ C|). The
leximin allocation with respect to f is EFX in the context of
allocation of combinations of goods and chores for agents
that have general but identical valuations.
Proof. Let A be an allocation that is not EFX. We will show
that A cannot be the leximin allocation with respect to f .
Since A is not EFX, there exists a pair of agents i, j such
that either
∃g ∈ Aj ∩G s.t. v(Ai) < v(Aj\{g})
or
∃c ∈ Ai ∩ C s.t. v(Ai) < v(Aj ∪ {c}).
Case 1: There exist agents i, j and a good g ∈ Aj ∩G such
that v(Ai) < v(Aj\{g}).
Let i be any agent with utilitymink v(Ak), the above con-
dition must be true, so we assume without loss of generality
that i = argmink v(Ak). If there are multiple agents with
minimumutility inA, let i be the one considered last in the or-
deringXA. Recall that according to Algorithm 1, XA is ob-
tained by ordering agents by increasing objective tuple f(Ai)
and then by some arbitrary but consistent tiebreak method.
Define a new allocation B where Bi = Ai ∪ {g}, Bj =
Aj\{g}, and Bk = Ak for all k /∈ {i, j}. Let S be the set of
agents appearing before i inXA. The only bundles that differ
between allocationsA and B are those of i and j, so we have
Ak = Bk for all k ∈ S. Thus for all k ∈ S, v(Bk) =
v(Ak) = v(Ai). Since v(Bj) = v(Aj\{g}) > v(Ai), j must
occur after every agent in S in XB.
Since g ∈ G, v(Bi) = v(Ai ∪ {g}) ≥ v(Ai). If v(Bi) >
v(Ai), i must occur after every agent in S, since v(Bi) >
v(Ai) = v(Bk). If v(Bi) = v(Ai), i must still occur after
every agent in S, since we sort by increasing number of goods
if both agents have the same utility.
The utility of every agent besides i and j are the same in A
andB. We also proved that i and j will still be after S inXB.
This means that the first |S| agents in both XA and XB are
the same, so the leximin comparison won’t terminate before
position |S|+ 1 in the orderings.
Let T be the set of agents appearing after i inXA. Since i
is the last agent with minimum utility, we know
v(Bk) = v(Ak) > v(Ai) ∀k ∈ T \{j}.
Now consider the (|S| + 1)th agent. We know XA|S|+1 = i.
If XB|S|+1 = i, we know |Ai ∩G| < |Bi ∩ G|, so A ≺ B. If
XB|S|+1 = k for some k 6= i, we know v(Ai) < v(Bk), so
A ≺ B as well.
Case 2: There exist agents i, j and a chore c ∈ Ai ∩ C
such that v(Ai) < v(Aj ∪ {c}).
Define a new allocation B where Bi = Ai\{c}, Bj =
Aj ∪ {c}, andBk = Ak for all k /∈ {i, j}. Let S be the set of
agents appearing before i in XA, T be the set of agents with
the same utility, number of goods and number of chores as i in
A and U = S ∪T \ {i}. The only bundles that differ between
allocationsA andB are those of i and j, so we haveAk = Bk
for all k ∈ U . Thus for all k ∈ U , v(Bk) = v(Ak) ≤ v(Ai).
Since v(Bj) = v(Aj ∪ {c}) > v(Ai), j must occur after
every agent in U in XB.
Since c ∈ C, v(Bi) = v(Ai\{c}) ≥ v(Ai). If v(Bi) >
v(Ai), i must occur after every agent in U , since v(Bi) >
v(Ai) ≥ v(Bk) for all k ∈ U . If v(Bi) = v(Ai), i must
still occur after every agent in U , since we sort by decreasing
number of chores if two bundles have the same utility and the
same number of goods.
The utility of every agent besides i and j are the same in
A and B. We also proved that i and j will both be after U
in XB . This means that the first |U | agents in XA and XB
have the same utility, number of goods and number of chores
pairwise. The leximin comparisonwon’t terminate before po-
sition |U |+ 1 in the orderings.
Now consider the (|U |+ 1)th agent. SupposeXA|U|+1 = l.
We know l is the last agent with the same utility, number of
goods and number of chores as i in XA. If XB|U|+1 = i, we
know v(Al) ≤ v(Bi), |Al ∩ G| = |Bi ∩ G| and |Al ∩ C| >
|Bi ∩C|, so A ≺ B. IfXB|U|+1 = k for some k 6= i, there are
three possibilities since k appears after l in XA,
1. v(Al) < v(Bk)
2. v(Al) = v(Bk) and |Al ∩G| < |Bk ∩G|
3. v(Ai) = v(Bk) and |Al∩G| = |Bk∩G| and |Al∩C| >
|Bk ∩ C|.
In all three possibilities, we have A ≺ B.
Since A ≺ B in both cases, A cannot be the leximin al-
location with respect to f. Therefore, the leximin allocation
with respect to f must be EFX.
4.1 Pareto-optimality
The leximin solution does not make any guarantee for effi-
ciency in the previous setting. However, if we are willing
to make a small assumption about the valuation function, the
leximin solution can achieve EFX and PO at the same time.
This assumption is on marginal utilities.
Similar to [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2017], we say that a
valuation v has nonzero marginal utility if for every set of
items S ⊂M, v(S∪{g}) > v(S) for all g ∈ G\S and v(S∪
{c}) < v(S) for all c ∈ C\S. If we assume all agents have
nonzero marginal utilities, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let f(S) = v(S). The leximin allocation with
respect to f is EFX and PO in the context of allocation of
combinations of goods and chores for agents that have gen-
eral but identical valuations with nonzero marginal utility.
Proof. Now letA be an allocation that is not EFX. Then there
exists a pair of agents i, j such that either
∃g ∈ Aj ∩G s.t. v(Ai) < v(Aj\{g})
or
∃c ∈ Ai ∩ C s.t. v(Ai) < v(Aj ∪ {c}).
Assume without loss of generality that i = argmink v(Ak).
If there are multiple agents with minimum utility in A, let i
be the one considered last in the orderingXA.
Case 1: There exist agents i, j and a good g ∈ Aj ∩ G
such that v(Ai) < v(Aj\{g}).
Define a new allocation B where Bi = Ai ∪ {g},
Bj = Aj\{g}, and Bk = Ak for all k /∈ {i, j}.
Let S be the set of agents appearing before i in XA.
Since we assume nonzero marginal utility and g ∈ G,
v(Bi) = v(Ai ∪ {g}) > v(Ai). In addition, we know that
v(Bi) = v(Aj\{g}) > v(Ai). So i and j must occur after
every agent in S in XB . The first |S| agents in XA and XB
are the same, so the leximin comparison will not terminate
before position |S|+ 1 in the orderings.
Let T be the set of agents appearing after i in XA.
Since i is the last agent with minimum utility, we know
v(Bk) = v(Ak) > v(Ai) ∀k ∈ T \{j}.
Now consider the (|S| + 1)th agent. We know XA|S|+1 = i.
If XB|S|+1 = i, we know v(Ai) < v(Bi), so A ≺ B. If
XB|S|+1 = k for some k 6= i, we know v(Ai) < v(Bk), so
A ≺ B as well.
Case 2: There exist agents i, j and a chore c ∈ Ai ∩ C
such that v(Ai) < v(Aj ∪ {c}).
Define a new allocation B where Bi = Ai\{c},
Bj = Aj ∪ {c}, and Bk = Ak for all k /∈ {i, j}.
Let S = {k|v(Ak) ≤ v(Ai), k 6= i}. For all k ∈ S,
v(Bk) = v(Ak) ≤ v(Ai). Since we assume nonzero
marginal utility and c ∈ C, v(Bi) = v(Ai\{c}) > v(Ai). In
addition, we know that v(Bj) = v(Aj ∪ {c}) > v(Ai). So
i and j must occur after every agent in S in XB . The first
|S| agents in XA and XB have the same utility pairwise, so
the leximin comparison will not terminate before position
|S|+ 1 in the orderings.
Now consider the (|S| + 1)th agent. Suppose XA|S|+1 = l.
We know v(Al) = v(Ai). If X
B
|S|+1 = i, we know
v(Al) < v(Bi), so A ≺ B. If XB|S|+1 = k for some k 6= i
and k /∈ S, we know v(Al) = v(Ai) < v(Bk), so A ≺ B as
well.
Since A ≺ B in both cases, A cannot be the leximin
solution. Therefore the leximin solution must be EFX.
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we formally studied the fair allocation problem
involving both indivisible goods and chores. Our work shows
that the leximin solution provides compelling fairness guar-
antee even when indivisible chores are involved. Some inter-
esting questions for future research are whether EFX/EF1 and
PO allocation always exists for 3 or more agents and whether
PROP1 and PO allocation always exists for 5 or more agents
when the agents have distinct valuation functions.
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